Notas sobre
The Social
Conquest of Earth
José
Angel García Landa
Notas sobre el libro de E. O.
Wilson The Social Conquest of Earth (Nueva York y Londres: Liveright,
2012). Una búsqueda del origen y naturaleza de la humanidad más seria que el
mito de este año, Prometheus.
Prólogo
"There is no grail more elusive or precious in the life of the mind
than the key to the understanding of the human condition" (1). Gauguin's
painting D'où Venons Nous / Que Sommes Nous / Où Allons Nous — (Wilson
seems to present this as an analogue of our self-search and of the persistence
of what Gauguin calls "our primitive soul").
I - Why
Does Advanced Social Life Exist?
1. The Human Condition
7: "Religion will never solve this great riddle. Since
Paleolithic times each tribe—of which there have been countless
thousands—invented its own creation myth." The dreamtime, in which
supernatural beings spoke to shamans and prophets.
8: "The creation myth was the essential bond that held the tribe together.
It provided its believers with a unique identity, commanded their fidelity,
strengthened order, vouchsafed law, encouraged valor and sacrifice, and offred
meaning to the cycles of life and death." "The truth of each myth
lived in the heart, not in the rational mind. By itself, mythmaking could never
discover the origin and meaning of humanity. But the reverse order is possible.
The discovery of the origin and meaning of humanity might explain the origin
and meaning of myths, hence the core of organized religion. // Can these two
worldviews ever be reconciled? The answer, to put the matter honestly and
simply, is no."
To know what we are, "We need to understand how the brain evolved the way
it did, and why" (9). This is a scientific not a philosophical question:
"There is a real creation story of humanity, and one only, and it is not a
myth. It is being worked out and tested, and enriched and strengthened, step by
step" (...) "we need answers to two even more fundamental questions
the query has raised. The first is why advanced social life exists at all, and
has occurred so rarely in the history of life. The second is the identity of
the driving forces that brought it into existence". We have learned about
our identity and makeup from worms and fruit flies: "We have no less to
learn from the social insects, in this case to add background to the origin and
meaning of humanity" (10).
Wilson
es un etólogo del comportamiento animal, y un especialista en hormigas. No
sería de sorprender que en su enfoque haya más analogías de las aceptables
entre hormigas y humanos—una vez hechas las distinciones pertinentes, quizá no
lleguen a apreciarse plenamente las diferencias cruciales.
2.
Where Do We Come From?
2. The Two Paths to Conquest
"We are an evolutionary chimera, living on intelligence steered
by the demands of animal instinct. This is the reason we are mindlessly dismantling
the biosphere and, with it, our own prospects for permanent existence"
(13). Wilson
se atiene a la noción del jet-lag
paleolítico—hemos evolucionado demasiado deprisa, y estamos fuera de paso
con el entorno natural y con nosotros mismos: "There was no time for us to
coevolve with the rest of the biosphere. Other
species were not prepared for the onslaught. This shortfall soon had dire
consequences for the rest of life" (15). "Wherever humans saturated
wildlands, biodiversity was returned to the paucity of its earliest period half
a biliion years previously. The rest of the living world could not coevolve
fast enough to accomodate the onslaught of a spectacular conqueror that seemed
to come from nowhere, and it began to crumble from the pressure" (16). (La
invasión alien somos nosotros, podría decirse).
Los grupos humanos se basan en alianzas flexibles entre diversos grupos y
círculos:
"The necessity for fine-graded evaluation by alliance meant that the prehuman
ancestors had to achieve eusociality in a radically different way from the
intinct-driven insects. Tha pathway to eusociality was charted by a contest
between selection based on the relative success of individuals within groups
versus relative success among groups. The strategies of this game were written
as a complicated mix of closely calibrated altruism, cooperation, competition,
domination, reciprocity, defection, and deceit" (17).
"As a result, the human brain became simultaneously highly intelligent and
intensely social. It had to build mental scenarios of personal relationships
rapidly, both short-term and long-term. Its memories had to travel far into the
past to summon old scenarios and far into the future to imagine the
consequences of every relationship" (17).
La idea central del libro es la comparación y contraste entre la socialidad de
los insectos y la humana, y sus orígenes evolutivos respectivos:
"The insects could evolve to eusociality by individual selection in the
queen line, generation to generation; the pre-humans evolved to eusociality by
the interplay of selection at the level of individual selection and at the
level of the group" (20).
3. The Approach
"Viewed through time from the beginning to the attainment of the human
condition, each step can be interpreted as a preadaptation" (22). (Observo que este énfasis en la
preadaptación, o exaptación como la llama
Gould, aparece también enfatizada en el libro de Ian Tattersall Masters of the Planet—por
fin parece que está haciendo fortuna esta noción entre los evolucionistas más
influyentes. En este capítulo se trata del desarrollo de la socialidad en los
australopitecos y primeros homo—enfatizándose la noción del control del fuego y
de un campamento fijo como puntos de inflexión del desarrollo de la vida
social).
4. The Arrival
Hay mayor frecuencia de especiación en los mamíferos que forman grupos
sociales: "social groups tend to stay apart from each other during
breeding, thus creating smaller populations, making them subject to both
quicker genetic divergence and higher extinction rates" (35)—algo que
parece compadecerse bien con la historia evolutiva de los homínidos. Se trata
aquí la adaptación a nuevos ecosistemas, nuevas dietas, nuevos nichos
ecológicos, por parte de los homínidos. El impulso final a la evolución del
Homo sapiens moderno lo proporcionó la concentración de grupos en lugares
protegidos.
5. Threading the Evolutionary Maze
Aquí viene a convenir Wilson (sin mencionarlo) con el mismo panorama
de evolución de la socialidad que presentaba Derek Bickerton en Adam's
Tongue: "The advantages of cooperation in the harvesting of meat led to
the formation of highly organized groups. The earliest societies conssted of
extended families but also adoptees and allies. They expanded to a population
as large as could be sustained by the local environment" (Wilson 47).
6. The
Creative Forces
¿Qué
fuerza evolutiva fue la que propició el surgimiento del tipo de socialidad
humano? Durante mucho tiempo el consenso mayoritario en evolucionismo ha
favorecido la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva, basada en la selección natural de
los genes pertenecientes al individuo y a su grupo de familiares, derivando de
ahí los comportamientos altruistas que promueven la socialidad:
"Unfortunately for this perception, the foundations of the general theory of
inclusive fitness based on the assumption of kin selection have crumbled, while
evidence for it has grown equivocal at best. The
beautiful theory never worked well anyway, and now it has collapsed" (51).
Ahora Wilson defiende la selección multinivel, con gran importancia dada a la
selección grupal: "The
creation of new groups by humans, at the present time and all the way back in
to prehistory, has been fundamentally different (...). Their evolutionary
dynamics, driven by both individual and group selection" (52).
Hay una
cita de Darwin que justifica la selección multinivel y de grupo, y la
preponderancia de los grupos cohesionados y formados por altruistas. Aunque Wilson cita esta otra de The Descent of Man:
"Now if some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the others, invented
a new snare or weapon, or other means of attack or defence, the plainest
self-interest, without the assistance of much reasoning power, would prompt the
other members to imitate him; and all would thus profit. The habitual practice
of each new art must likewise in some slight degree strengthen the intellect.
If the new invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in number,
spread, and supplant other tribes. In a tribe thus rendered more numerous there
would always be a rather better chance of the birth of other superior and
inventive members. If such men left children to inherit their mental
superiority, the chance of the birth of still more ingenious members would be
somewhat better, and in a very small tribe decidedly better. Even if they left
no children, the tribe would still include their blood-relations; and it has
been ascertained by agriculturists that by preserving and breeding from the
family of an animal, which when slaughtered was found to be valuable, the
desired character has been obtained."
(Se
observará que también sostiene la cita la noción de inteligencia tecnológica:
la comunicación de tecnologías aumenta la inteligencia grupal; es "la
inteligencia de las masas" antes de David Weinberger).
Hay una dinámica contraria irresuluble de altruismo y egoísmo en las sociedades
humanas: "Beause all normal members have at least the capacity to
reproduce, there is an inherent and irremediable conflict in human societies
between natural selection at the individual level and natural selection at the
group level" (54)—al contrario que en las sociedades de insectos, donde
falta la capacidad reproductiva de los individuos subordinados. El nivel de
selección individual promueve en los humanos el comportamiento egoísta,
cobarde, interesado; mientras que el comportamiento generoso, virtuoso,
altruista es promovido por los valores sociales y la selección de grupo. "It was therefore inevitable that the genetic code prescribing
social behaviour of modern humans is a chimera. One part prescribes traits
that favor success of individuals within the group. The other part prescribes the traits that favor group success in
competition with other groups" (53).
Wilson
observa que debido a la estructura poblacional y ciclo vital de los mamíferos
no puede desarrollarse entre los humanos un tipo de socialidad como el de los
insectos. (Quizá habría que matizar, "de modo natural"—aunque
quizá sea factible mediante ingeniería genética y y el control artificial de la
reproducción semejante futuro indeseable, en parte imaginado por Huxley en Un
Mundo Feliz).
Las consecuencias de la dinámica evolutiva de los humanos, que nos hace lo que
somos:
- Intensa competencia grupal y territorial
- Inestabilidad de la composición de los grupos: conquistas, divisiones,
alianzas, etc.
- Guerra inevitable entre los valores sociales y los intereses egoístas e
individuales, productos respectivamente de la selección grupal e individual
- "The perfecting of quick and expert reading of intention in others has
been paramount in the evolution of human social behavior" (56).
- "Much of culture, including especially the content of the creative arts,
has arisen from the inevitable clash of individual selection and group
selection" (56).
7. Tribalism is a Fundamental Human Trait
(El tribalismo, la tendencia a afiliarnos a grupos, la tenemos según Wilson
en nuestra propia constitución, lo hacemos por naturaleza y compulsivamente;
algo que permite explicar las actitudes irracionales de los individuos hacia
grupos de iguales, bandas, equipos de fútbol, etnias y naciones, credos
religiosos.... donde lo que menos importa es la fundamentación supuesta del
grupo, y lo primordial en realidad es el grupo mismo y la sensación de
pertenencia e identificación): "To form groups, drawing visceral
comfort and pride from familiar fellowship, and to defend the group
enthusiastically against rival groups—these are among the absolute universals
of human nature and hence of culture" (57). "The
social world of each modern human is not a single tribe, but rather a system of
interlocking tribes, among which it is often difficult to find a single
compass" (57). Experimentos
psicológicos demuestran la tendencia a la afiliación aunque sea en grupos
arbitrariamente asignados: "Strong favoritism was consistently shown to
those labeled simply as an in-group, even with no other incentive and no
previous contact" (59) (Algo que puede explicar algunos comportamientos
patológicos en la Administración, supuestamente desapasionada, como son la falacia democrática de los órganos o la
solidaridad interna de los comités y comisiones). Diferentes partes del
cerebro regulan la respuesta automática a la afiliación grupal: por ejemplo el
racismo instintivo y primitivo de la amígdala se modera cuando el contexto
sitúa a los miembros de otra raza como pertenecientes a un grupo afiliado,
información procesada por partes corticales del cerebro asociadas al
aprendizaje avanzado. (Una paradoja plantea el tribalismo. Los valores
humanos son en gran medida culturales, y vienen a expresar la afiliación a un
grupo. Son por tanto limitadores con respecto a la potencial naturaleza
humana—pero a la vez ésta sólo puede manifestarse y expresarse plenamente
mediante la integración en un grupo y un entorno cultural. Hay así una tensión
o dialéctica entre comprensión de la naturaleza humana y participación en ella.
El observador de la dinámica de los grupos humanos puede sentirse ajeno a la
dinámica que observa, pero ha de integrarse igualmente en un grupo propio).
8. War as Humanity's Hereditary Curse
(De esto hablamos algo en Somos
hijos de la guerra), llevando las conclusiones evolutivas un poco más lejos
que Wilson, en el sentido de la guerra como supervivencia del grupo más apto...
para la guerra. Ver su p. 91). También para Wilson, la guerra ha sido una
constante de la historia humana, y el conflicto entre grupos algo que ha
definido a los humanos a lo largo de toda su historia. Las pacíficas sociedades
primitivas sin conflictos no existen. Los conflitos grupales ya existen entre
los chimpancés, pero los humanos tendemos por naturaleza a expandirnos hasta
agotar los recursos y disputarlos a los vecinos.
9. The Breakout
La emigración del Homo sapiens out of Africa se limitó a
grupos pequeños, con lo cual la variabilidad genética dentro de Africa es mucho
mayor. Hubo sin embargo un cuello de botella poblacional en una gran sequía en
el que la población de Africa descendió a unos miles de individuos con riesgo
de extinción completa. A Europa llegaron los Homo sapiens hacia el 42.000 A.C.;
a Australia y Nueva Guinea ya en el 50.000 A.C.—los aborígenes descendientes
directos de los primeros emigrantes. En America entraron hace unos 16.500 años;
y las islas del Pacífico son las más recientes, hace entre 3000 años y el año
1200.
10. The Creative Explosion
Tres hipótesis sobre la explosión cultural: 1) debida a una mutación
cognitiva reciente en el Homo sapiens. Comparativamente con el inmovilismo de
la cultura neandertal. 2) Evolución más gradual, ya comenzada en el Homo
sapiens arcaico. 3) Teoría de alzas y bajas, con un surgimiento inicial y una
crisis debida al cuello de botella poblacional—con recuperación a partir de
60.000 años atrás. Wilson combina las tres hipótesis. Las mutaciones genéticas
se hacen más frecuentes al crecer la población, y ese mismo hecho produce más
innovaciones culturales. La deriva genética también actúa más durante la
expansión de pequeños grupos de poblaciones aisladas, produciendo diversidad. 88: "As a result, skin color, height, percentages of blood types,
and other nonvital hereditary traits shifted a bit in one direction or another
over distances as short as a few hundreds of kilometers." (Y es a esta peculiar
combinación de origen común y dispersión geográfica en pequeños grupos a lo que
debemos las "razas" humanas, o sea, la variabilidad genética
identificablemente ligada a la dispersión territorial, aunque muchos
científicos se niegan a admitir ningún concepto científicamente viable de
diferencia racial). El entorno cultural es en todo caso mucho más
influyente para el comportamiento individual que las diferencias genéticas. Sin embargo: "A recent study has found that variation in the
number of people one person has in contacts or in social ties, as well as
variation in transitivity—the likelihood that any two of a person's contacts
are connected to each other's contacts—are both about half due to heredity. On
the other hand, the number of other group members whom individuals view as
friends is not genetically influenced, at least not within ordinary statistical
limits of the measures taken" (90). "Bands and communities of bands
with better combinations of cultural innovations became more productive and
better equipped for competitition and war. Their rivals either copied them or
else were displaced and their territories taken. Thus group selection drove the evolution of
culture" (91). (Es el motor de lo que llamamos la historia). La
agricultura surgió independientemente en ocho emplazamientos distintos, entre
9000 y 4000 años antes de Cristo. El desarrollo cultural puede llevar en el
futuro a un posthumanismo que pare Wilson sería indeseable pues iría al
servicio del nepotismo y el privilegio: de la herencia biológica que tenemos no
nos libraremos, pues es lo que somos.
10. The Sprint to Civilization
Tres niveles de civilización hay: las bandas de cazadores-recolectores y
agricultores primitivos, sociedades igualitarias; las poblaciones con élites y
jefes, que gobiernan directamente en todos los asuntos para evitar fisión e
insurrección, suprimiendo rivales y fomentando la rivalidad con pueblos
vecinos. Y tercero, los estados, con sistema de control delegado o burocracia.
Las poblaciones tienden a la expansión y adquisición de los recursos del vecino
siempre que pueden. No hay diferencias genéticas conocidas que demuestren
diferencias entre las poblaciones en procesamiento de lenguaje o
matemáticas—pero podrían descubrirse. Los rasgos de personalidad están
notablemente bien distribuidos entre las poblaciones, a pesar de los
estereotipos nacionales. Los básicos son:
"extroversion versus introversion, antagonism versus agreeableness,
conscientiousnss, neuroticism, and openness to experience". Los rasgos caracteriológicos
son en buena proporción hereditarios. La complejidad social se desarrolló en
torno a los estados y a la escritura; Wilson remite al análisis de Jared
Diamond en Guns, Germs and Steel para explicar el mayor desarrollo de
unas áreas frente a otras y la difusión de las innovaciones.
III.
How Social Insects Conquered the Invertebrate World
12. The invention of eusociality
Las hormigas, evolucionadas a partir de las avispas solitarias para
constituir sociedades complejas. Hay un millón de veces más hormigas que
humanos, aunque su biomasa total viene a ser parecida.
13. Inventions that Advanced the Social Insects
Coincidió el desarrollo y diversificación de las hormigas con el de las
angiospermas. "Species of ants multiplied, as more and more niches opened for
them to occupy" (125). Son carnívoras, pero herbívoros indirectos, utilizando a los pulgones
que absorben savia de las plantas. "The more
elaborate and expensive the nest is in energy and time, the greater the
fieceness of the ants that defend it. This is a concept I will later
connnect to the origin of eusociality itself." (130)
IV. The
Forces of Social Evolution
14. The Scientific Dilemma of Rarity
"Eusociality, the condition of multiple generations organized into
groups by means of an altruistic division of labor, was one of the major
innovations in the history of life" (133). But it is extremely rare:
"Only 15 of the 2,600 families are known to contain eusocial
species." (136). "Yet of all the nonprimate mammals in the world save
the mole rats, and of all the primate species that lived across the tropical
and subtropical regions for millions of years, only one, an offshoot of the
African great apes, an antecedent of Homo sapiens, crossed the threshold
into eusociality" (138).
15. Insect altruism and eusociality explaind
"The selfish-gene approach may seem to be entirely reasonable. In
fact, most evolutionary biologists had accepted it as a virtual dogma—at least
until 2010. In that year Martin Nowak, Corina Tarnita, and I demonstrated that
inclusive-fitness theory, often called kin selection theory, is both
mathematically and biologically incorrect." (143) Insect societies of ants
and bees are superorganisms and their origin can be explained through the
selection of the reproducing individuals: "Group selection occurs, in the
sense that success or failure of the colony depends upon how well the collectivity
of the queen and her robotic offspring does in competition with solitary
individuals and other colonies. Group selection is a useful idea in identifying
precisely the targets of selection when queens (and their colonies about them)
are competing with other queens. But multilevel selection, in which colonial
evolution is regarded as the interests of the individual worker pitted against
the interests of its colony, may no longer be a useful concepts in which to
build models of genetic evolution in social insects" (146). (Esa selección mutinivel, y
de dinámica contradictoria entre tendencias individuales y grupales, es en
cambio la que sí se da para Wilson en los humanos; los principios de evolución
de la sociedad y el altruismo en insectos y primates son fundamentalmente
diferentes).
16. Insects Take the Giant Leap
Explica Wilson las condiciones necesarias para que los insectos solitarios
desarrollen un modo de vida social: a partir de una preadaptación, por ejemplo
un nido compartido con los padres, basta con una presión ambiental determinada
para dar el salto: "When all the necessary conditions occur—namely the
right pre-eusocial traits are in place, a eusocial allele also exists in the
population, even if at very low levels, and, finally, environmental pressures
exist that favor group activity—the solitary species will move across the
threshold into eusociality. The surprising aspect of
this evolutionary step is that the eusociality gene does not need to create new
forms of behavior. As in the case of many random mutations generally, it need
only silence a preexisting behavior, thus halting the dispersal of parents and
grown offspring from the nest. // As a result of the cancellation, the family
stays home. Looking at the matter the other way, the eusociality gene they
share with the mother queen has turned them into robots, expressing one state
of her own flexible phenotype. In this sense, I have argued, the primitive
colony is a superorganism. It is essentially a kind of organism in whivch the
working parts are not the usual cells but pre-subordinated organisms."
(151). "In crossing the line to eusociality, a single allele that disposes
daughters to stya can be fixed in the populations at large if the advantage of
the little group over solitaires outweighs the advantage of each offspring
leaving to try on its own" (153). "Although some individual direct
selection may play a role in the origin of eusociality, the force that targets
the maintenance and elaboration of eusociality is by necessity environmentally
based group selection, which acts upon the emergent traits of the group as a
whole" (155-56). "This origin of an anatomically distinct worker
caste appears to mark the 'point of no return' in evolution, at which eusocial
life becomes irreversible" (157).
17. How Natural Selection Creates Social Instincts
After the heyday of behaviorism and Skinner in the 1950s, "In the two
decades that followed, the idea of instinct shaped by natural selection
defeated this perception of the brain as a blank slate. At least it did so for
animals. For two more decades, however, the blank slate was kept alive for
human social behavior. Many writers in the social sciences and humanities
continued to insist that the mind is entirely the product of its environment
and past history" (158). Basic principles of evolutionary genetics:
"One of the principles is the distinction between the unit of heredity, as
opposed to the target of selection in the process that drives evolution. The unit
is a gene or arrangement of genes that form part of the hereditary code (...).
The target of selection is the trait or combination of traits encoded by
the units of heredity and favored or disfavored by the environment" (162).
"Traits (targets) that are acted upon exclusively by selection
between groups are those emerging from interactions among members of each
group. These interactions include communication, division of labor, dominance,
and cooperation in performing communal tasks" (163). Wilson emphasizes
that the amount of phenotype plasticity is itself subject to natural selection.
Finally, "It is easy to confuse proximate and ultimate causation in
particular cases, and especially in the complex multilevel process of human
evolution" (165). E.g. bipedality etc. are important preadaptations, but
the definitive cause of human sociality is the development of the human brain.
18. The Forces of Social Evolution
Possible sources of altruism and sociality: Wilson favors group
selection, i.e. "that hereditary altruists form groups so cooperative and
well-organized as to outcompete nonaltruist groups" (166). In the case of
hymenoptera, "the belief that haplodiploidy and eusociality are causally
linked became standard in general reviews and textbooks of the 1970s and
1980s" (170), now discredited, like kin selection and inclusive-fitness
theory; "there are mathematical difficulties with the definition of r,
the degree of relatedness. These difficulties render incorrect the oft-repeated
claim that group selection is the same as kin selection expressed through
inclusive fitness" (171). "Most biologists who knew inclusive-fitness
theory only from a distance were surprised to learn that when measures are
actually calculated there is no consistent biological concept behind the
'relatedness' parameter" (173). "If there is a general theory that
works for everything (multilevel natural selection) and a theory that works
only for some cases (kin selection), and in the few cases where the latter
works it agrees with the general theory of multilevel selection, why not simply
stay with the general theory everywhere?" (175). Wilson seems to point out
that some theorist were reaching foregone conclusions, instead from going from
the problem to a viable theory: "Almost all research in inclusive-fitness
theory has been the opposite: hypothesize the key roles of kinship and kin
selection, then look for evidence to test that hypothesis" (175).
"Kin selection, if it occurs at all in animals, must be a weak form
of selection that occurs only in special conditions easily violated. As the
object of general theory, inclusive fitness is a phantom mathematical
construction that cannot be fixed in any manner that conveys realistic
biological meaning" (20). So we find in Wilson here a strong argument
against methodological apriorism and formalism, and a defense of multilevel
selection and group selection against the traditional "selfish gene"
approach.
19. The Emergence of a New Theory of Eusociality
In social insects: "Grouping by family can accelerate the spread of
eusocial alleles, but it does not of itself lead to advanced social behavior.
The causative agent of advanced social behavior is the advantage of a
defensible nest, especially one expensive to make and within reach of a
sustainable supply of food. Because of this primary condition in the insects,
close genetic relatedness in primitive colony formation is the consequence, not
the cause, of eusocial behavior" (185). (Lo cual no sé si es muy compatible con la noción
anteriormente expuesta de la modificación del comportamiento como origen: lo de
las crías quedándose en el nido en lugar de irse): "Crossing the threshold to
eusociality requires only that a female and her adult offspring fail to
disperse to start new, individual nests. Instead,
they remain at the old nest" (185)—(Y entonces eran parientes, to begin
with??). In ants or bees, "the queen and her workers have the same
genes that prescribe caste and division of labor, although they vary
extensively in other genes. This circumstance lends credence to the view that
the colony can be viewed as an individual organism or, more precisely, an
individual superorganism. Further, insofar as social behavior is concerned,
descent is from queen to queen, with the worker force as an extension of each
in turn. Group selection still occurs, but it is conceived to be selected as
the traits of the queen and the extrasomatic projection of her personal
genome" (186). "The natural history of the more primitively eusocial
animals, and especially the structure of their nests and fierce defense of
them, suggests that a key element in the origin of eusociality is defense
against enemies, including parasites, predators, and rival colonies"
(186)—Y es este elemento eusocial el que sí cree Wilson que es extensible a
las sociedades humanas, diferentes sin embargo de los insectos sociales en la
capacidad de reproducción de todos los individuos). In insects,
"Group-level selection drives changes in the insect colony life cycle and
social structures, often to bizarre extremes, producing elaborate
superorganisms" (187). In contrast, the human species has achieved a
"culture-based social condition" (187). How?
V. What
Are We?
20. What Is Human Nature?
"If raw, untransformed human nature were to be revealed, and the
philosophers's stone thus attained, what would it be? What it would look like?
Would we love it? A better question may be: Do we really want to know?"
(191). "The very existence of human nature was denied during the last
century by most social scientists. They clung to the dogma, in spite of
mounting evidence, that all social behavior is learned and all culture is the
product of history passed from one generation to the next" (191). (En el libro de Carlos
Beorlegui La singularidad de la especie humana aparece una discusión al
respecto, y una clasificación que distingue cuatro posiciones, biologista
rígida, biologista flexible, culturalista flexible y culturalista rígida.
Wilson aparece, en una versión anterior de su pensamiento, como biologista
flexible, y Beorlegui promueve la postura culturalista flexible, según la cual
la naturaleza humana es por la propia biología de la especie extremadamente
adaptable y moldeable por el entorno cultural. Por cierto que en el presente
libro Wilson ha modificado algunas posiciones evolucionistas genetistas de las
que eran criticadas por Beorlegui). "I believe that ample evidence, arising from multiple branches of
learning in the sciences and humanities, allows a clear definition of human
nature. But before suggesting it, let me first explain ewhat it is not. Human
nature is not the genes underlying it. They prescribe the developmental rules
of the brain, sensory system, and behavior that produce human nature. Nor can the
universals of culture discovered by
anthropologists be defined collectively as human nature. (192). "If the
genetic code underlying human nature is too close to its molecular underpinning
and the cultural universals are too far away from it, it follows that the best
place to search for hereditary human nature is in between, in the rules of
development prescribed by genes, through which the universals of culture are
created. // Human nature is the inherited regularities of mental development
common to our species. They are the 'epigenetic rules', which evolved by the
interaction of genetic and cultural evolution that occurred over a long period in deep prehistory" (193).
"The behaviors created by epigenetic rules are not hardwired like
reflexes. It is the epigenetic rules instead that are hardwired, and hence
compose the true core of huma nnature. These behaviors are learned, but the
process is what psychologists call 'prepared'" (194). Against the
"blank-slate" brain and the promethean gene of the 1970s and 1980s:
"This biologically nondimensional view of social evolution was further
deduced from a kind of second key hypothesis, the psychic unity of mankind.
This opinion held that human culture evolved during too short a time for
genetic evolution to have occurred, at least beyond the all-purpose promethean
genotype that separates humanity from other animal species" (197). But
"The explosion of new mutations that occurred following the breakout from
Africa some 60,000 years ago created large numbers of such potentially adaptive
new genes. It would be surprising that genetic evolution has not ocvcurred in
different populations as they colonized the rest of the world" (197-98).
Genes for milk digestion, for sickle-cell anemia, & older too: "Put
together, [such intertwined coevolutionary processes] form a class of genetic
changes different in kind from the local acquisition of lactose tolerance. They
are universal in modern humanity and also ancient, their origins predating the
emergence of modern Homo sapiens and at least in some cases even the
human-chimpanzee split of more than six million years ago. Working at the level
of cognition and emotion, their effect on the evolution of language and culture
has been both deep and wide. They make up much of what is intuitively called
'human nature'" (198-99). E.g. incest avoidance has been theorized
by anthropologists, as a basis for human culture, but "For the explanation of the origin of exogamy as an
instinct of profound genetic value, however, one need look no further than the
universal pattern followed by all other primate species" (200). The
example of relative universals for color terms and color perception. (A Wilson se le escapa en
sus especulaciones sobre el color la importancia de la asociación del rojo al
peligro debido al color de la sangre).
21. How Culture Evolved
"As defined broadly by both anthropologists and biologists,
culture is the combination of traits that distinguishes one group from another.
A culture trait is behavior that is either first invented within a group or
else learned from another group, then transmitted among members of the
group" (213). (Bueno,
se refiere a comportamiento y no a genes obviamente: pero queda la duda de si
las proprensiones cognitivas no aprendidas y desarrolladas en el seno de un
grupo existen y son heredables). "The elaboration of
culture depends upon long-term memory, and in this capacity humans rank far
above all animals" (214). Culture as collective memory of a
community—Wilson remembers the culture of his childhood Mobile, most of it now
lost. "The great gift of the human brain is the capacity—and with it the
irresistible inborn drive—to build scenarios. For each story in turn, the
conscious mind summons only a minute fraction of the brain's accumulated
long-term memory. How this is done remains controversial. One group of
neuroscientists argues that fragments of long-term memory are transformed from
long-term storage and congealed into working memory to make scenarios. A second
school believes, with the same data, that the process is achieved simply by the
arousal of long-term memory—with no transfer from one sector of the brain to
another needed" (215-16). Blank-slate theory of learning dismissed:
"the brain has a complex inherited architecture. As a consequence of the
way it was built, the conscious mind, one of the architecture's products,
originated by gene-culture coevolution, an intricate interplay of genetic and
cultural evolution" (217). Cognitive archaeology as the reconstruction of
cognitive process and complexity. "And what of speech? A conscious mind
able to generate abstractions and piece them together in a complex scenario
might, it seems, also generate a syntactical language, with sequences of
subject, verb, and object" (218). Neanderthals and FOX2 gene, they may
have had language; their children's brains matured faster. "What was the
driving force that led to the threshold of complex culture? It appears to have
been group selection. A gorup with members who could read intentions and
cooperate among themselves while predicting the actions of competing groups,
would have an enormous advantage over others less gifted. There was undoubtedly
competition among group members, leading to natural selection of traits that
gave advantage of one individual over another. But more important for a species
entering new environments and competing with powerful rivals were unity and
cooperation within the group. Morality, conformity, religious fervor and
fighting ability combined with imagination and memory to produce the
winner." (224).
22. The Origins of Language
"The clue to the advance of Homo, I believe, lies in the
cvritical preadaptation that had carried the few other evolving animal species
in the history of life that have managed to cross the eusociality threshold.
Every one, without exception, from the two dozen or so insect and crustacean
lines to the naked mole rats, defended a nest from which members could forage
for enough food to sustain the colony" (225). Homo habilis began
establishing campsites: "Now they selected defensible sites and fortified
them, with some staying for extended periods to protect the young while others
hunted. When controlled fire at the camp was added, the advantage of this way
of life was solidified" (226). Tomasello et al. "point out that the
primary and crucial difference between human cognition and that of other animal
species, including our closest genetic relatives, the chimpanzees, is the ability
to collaborate for the purpose of achieving shared goals and intentions. The
human speciality is intentionality, fashioned from an extremely large working
memory. We have become the experts at mind reading, and the world champions at
inventing culture" (226). Mind reading essential to human social networks,
they cooperate and read others' intentions better than chimpanzees:
"Humans, it appears, are successful not because of an elevated general
intelligence that addresses all challenges but because they are born to be
specialists in social skills. By cooperating through the communication and the
reading of intention, groups accomplish far more than the efforts of any
solitary person" (227). They developed shared attention,
common cooperative goals, and a theory of mind, "the recognition that
their own mental states were shared by others" (228). "Language as
the grail of human social evolution, achieved. Once installed, it bestowed
almost magical powers on the human species" (228). Tomasello: "What
is language if not a set of coordination devices for directing the attention of
others?" (qtd. in Wilson 229). (Not addressed by Wilson, but there is
an important argument regarding the growth of language BEFORE complex
intentionality, and one tied to socio-ecological transformations proper to the
human lineage, which is put forward by Derek Bickerton. See my summary/review
of Adam's
Tongue. Strange that Wilson
does not address this issue, being a specialist in
ants. The displacement
symbolism of language and the social sharing of attention may have converged
from different cognitive roots, and given rise to complex language through
emergence). "Unlike communication in bees and
other animals, human language became capable of detached representation, in
which reference is made to objects and events not present in the immediate
vicinity—or even in existence" (230). Chomsky vs Skinner, special module?
Perhaps both right, but Skinner more so: there is a time in early childhood
with special ability to learn, but no special brain module for grammar,
although "there does appear to be a biasing epigenetic rule for word order
embedded in our deeper cognitive structure, but its final products in grammar are
highly flexible and learned" (235); "the rapidly changing environment
of speech does not provide a stable environment for natural selection"
(235), so no inscribed language module. "It is not going too far, I
believe, to add that the failure of natural selection to create an independent
universal grammar has played a major role in the diversification of culture
and, from that flexibility and potential inventiveness, the flowering of human
genius" (235).
23. The Evolution of Cultural Variation
Con frecuencia se entiende mal el condicionamiento genético de la
cultura y el comportamiento, como si un elemento dado dependiese de una
alternativa tajante entre determinismo y constructivismo cultural: "What
genes prescribe or assist in prescribing is not one trait as opposed to another
but the frequency of traits and the pattern they form as cultural innovation
made them available. The expression of the genes may be plastic, allowing a
society to choose one or more traits from among a multiplicity of choices. Or
else it may not be plastic, allowing only one trait to be chosen by all
societies" (236). "Biologists who study development have discovered
that the degree of plasticity in the expression of genes, like the presence of
the genes themselves, is subject to evolution by natural selection" (237).
Small variations like the alteration in the amount of an existing protein,
produce finely-tuned changes in structure or behavior. "Cultural variation
in humans is determined mostly by two properties of social behavior, both of
which are subject to evolution by natural selection. The first is the degree of
bias in the epigenetic rulevery low in dress fashion, very high in incest
avoidance. The second property of cultural variation is the likelihood that
individual group members imitate others in the same society who have adapted [adopted?]
the trait ('sensitivity to usage pattern')." (Aquí podría hablarse de los
"early adopters", las modas e influencias de las élites y
vanguardias, y del principio de "dónde va Vicente, donde va la
gente").
24. The Origins of Morality and Honor
(Este es uno de los puntos principales del libro de Wilson, identificando la
peculiaridad del comportamiento social humano y de los dilemas morales como
resultado de una tensión entre dos principios selectivos: selección
individidual, y de grupo, que han dado forma a la especie humana por selección
multinivel). "The dilemma of good and evil was
created by multilevel selection, in which individual selection and group
selection act together on the same individual but largely in opposition to each
other. Individual selection is the result of competition for survival and
reproduction among members of the same group. It shapes instincts in each
member that are fundamentally selfish with reference to other members. In
contrast, group selection consists of competition between societies, through
both direct conflict and differential competence in exploiting the environment.
Group selection shapes instincts that tend to make individuals altruistic toward
one another (but not towards members of other groups). Individual selection is
responsible for much of what we call sin, while group selection is responsible
for the greater part of virtue. Together they have created the conflict between
the poorer and the better angels of our nature" (241). (Habría que matizar que la
cuestión queda un tando desdibujada por el hecho de que la selección individual
no sólo selecciona al individuo frente a otros individuos del grupo, sino
también frente a seres o grupos de seres de otras especies que compiten por los
mismos recursos; y la selección de grupo no sólo selecciona a un grupo frente a
otros grupos de la misma especie, sino también frente a otros seres o grupos
que compiten por los mismos recursos. Wilson
tiene otras definiciones más restrictivas:) "Individual
selection, defined precisely, is the differential longevity and fertility
of individuals in competition with other members of the group. Group selection
is the differential longevity and lifetime fertility of those genes that
prescribe traits of interaction among members of the group, having arisen
during competition with other groups" (242). (Son definiciones que a mi
entender no agotan todo el terreno de la competencia por la vida, la
reproducción y los recursos). "To see human nature as the product of this evolutionary trajectory is
to unlock the ultimate causes of our sensations and thought. To put together
both proximate and ultimate causes is the key to self-understanding, the means
to see ourselves as we truly are and then to explore outside the box"
(242). "Group selection in its turn promoted the genetic interests of
individuals with privilege and status as rewards for outstanding performance on
behalf of the tribe" (243). (Not quite, I think: group selection
promotes the dynamics of the whole tribe as against competitors, not the
genetic interests of any individuals. That is individual selection, which
nonetheless may work within the cultural ecosystem of the tribe in the way
Wilson says, through the promotion of ideologies and modes of behavior which
have arisen through group selection. Which may give rise to the paradox pointed
out by Wilson next, one that I further comment on in Sociobiological
Key Largo). "Nevertheless, an iron rule exists in genetic social evolution. It is
that selfish individuals beat altruistic individuals, while groups of altruists
beat groups of selfish individuals. The victory can never be complete: the
balance of selection pressures cannot move to either extreme. If individual
selection were to dominate, societies would dissolve. if group selection were
to dominate, human groups would resemble ant colonies" (243). Vs.
overestimating the importance of kin selection in groups: "Kinship influences
the structure of the network, but it is not the key to its evolutionary
dynamics as is wrongly posited by inclusive-fitness theory. Instead, what
counts is the hereditary propensity to form the myriad alliances, favors,
exchanges of information, and betrayals that make up daily life in the
network" (243). "Our instincts desire the tiny, united-band networks
that prevailed during the hundreds of millennia preceding the dawn of history. Our instincts remain unprepared
for civilization" (244). (Bueno, los de algunos más que los de otros,
será... Algunos bien que maximizan la
civilización). "We worry. We ask, to whom
in this shifting global world of countless overlapping groups should we pledge
our loyalty?" (245). Social empathy: "unless people are psychopaths,
they automatically feel the pain of others" (245). (Pero a veces si no son de
nuestro grupo no parece importar mucho, ¿no?). Pfaff:
brain's ability to "lose" oneself psychologically and transfer one's
identity a bit to another person; often in the clash of emotions; "The
brain of our Janus-like species is a supremely complex system of intersecting
nerve cells, hormones, and neurotransmitters. It creates processes that
variously reinforce or cancel one another out, accoridng to context" (245).
Meeting of cooperators will not necessarily promote the rise of cooperation:
"Only group selection, with groups containing more cooperators pitted
against groups with fewer cooperators, will result in a shift at the level of
the species toward greater and wider instinctive cooperation" (248). (Una cuestión quizá oscurecida
aquí es con
quién se coopera: no con miembros de la misma especie, sino con miembros del
mismo grupo. Si bien la especie es en diversos contextos un grupo, en sentido
amplio. Quiero decir que lo que fomenta la selección de grupo no es sólo la
cooperación, sino también la capacidad de confrontación con otros grupos: si no
estrictamente la hostilidad hacia otros grupos, sí las alianzas variables y
cambiantes, de manera que "los nuestros" y "los otros" se
dividen según líneas muy móviles, pero una vez delimitados en un caso dado se
les aplica una norma inflexible: together we stand, divided we fall; los
nuestros siempre tienen razón; a los otros, no hay que darles ni agua. Así, la
selección de grupo fomenta, creo, la cooperación entre el grupo, la capacidad
de flexibilizar el grupo mediante alianzas, Y LA HOSTILIDAD frente a los grupos
rivales. Somos hijos de la guerra. También
se ve esta característica humana con especial y desagradable claridad en las
escenas en que hay que elegir rápidamente bandos en un conflicto: ya sea en las
obras históricas de Shakespeare, en Juego de Tronos, o al comienzo de la Guerra
Civil española. O conmigo, o contra mí: hasta Jesucristo lo dijo). Otra regla
social es la lucha contra el parasitismo: "Relentless
ambivalence and ambiguity are the fruits of the strange primate inheritance
that rules the human mind. To be human is also to
level others, especially those who appear to receive more than they have
earned. Even within the ranks of the elite, delicate games are played to
achieve ever higher status while steering through the succesive ranks of
jealous rivals. Be modest in demeanor, ever modest, is the necessary
stratagem" (249). (Donde hay mucha cooperación social, se potencia también mediante
selección individual el parasitismo. Parasitismo lo hay a todos los niveles:
desde el establecido por ley, privilegiando a las élites, hasta el que se basa
en sortear o vulnerar las leyes. De ahí las dinámicas contrarias, de
potenciación del parasitismo, y de las estrategias antiparasitarias, de las que
habla Wilson. Esas estrategias son por una parte pro-sociales, y por otra
antisociales, en la medida en que la misma existencia de la sociedad fomenta el
parasitismo. Quizá lo complejo de esta dinámica no quede bien captado en la
descripción de Wilson). "Since everyone
knows the game, people are always willing to counter it if they safely can.
They are acutely sensitive to hypocrisy and ever ready to level thoseo on the
rise whose credentials are anything less than impeccable. All levelers, which
means just about everybody, have a formidable armament at their disposal.
Roasts, jokes, parodies, and mocking laughter are remedies to weaken the
haughty and over-ambitious" (249). (También lo son la simulación de trabajar, donde
el parasitismo se junta con el antiparasitismo; el sabotaje, la hostilidad a
los poderosos....). "People gain
visceral pleasure in more than just leveling and cooperating. They also enjoy
seeing punishment meted out to those who do not cooperate (freeloaders,
criminals) and even to those who do not contribute at levels commensurate with
their status (the idle rich)." (250). "In the brain, the
administration of such 'altruistic punishment' lights up the bilateral anterior
insula, a center of the brain also activated by pain, anger, and disgust"
(251). "Our species is not Homo oeconomicus. At the end of the day,
it emerges as something more complicated and interesting. We are Homo
sapiens, imperfect beings, solidering on with conflicted impulses through
an unpredictable, implacably threatening world, doing our best with what we
have" (251). Most values in human societies stand the test of biology-based
realism; others do not—"such as the ban on artificial conception,
condemnation of homosexual preference and forced marriages of adolescent
girls". Scientific knowledge of human nature will benefit ethical
reflection, even if the result seems relativistic to some.
25. The Origins of Religion
Sobre el extraño predominio de los creyentes en un país educado como
EE.UU.: "There are historical reasons why fundamentalist Protestants make
up such a large percentage of Americans, which I leave to historians to
explain. But to those who believe that their culture might be broken by
ridicule and reason, I say think again. There are circumstances under which
intelligent, well-educated people equate their identity and the meaning of
their lives with their religion, and this is one of them" (257). "The
evidence that lies before us in great abundance points to organized religion as
an expression of tribalism" (258). "The illogic of religions is not a
weakness in them, but their essential strength" (259). Los líderes religiosos debían
con frecuencia sus visiones a estados mentales alterados, alucinógenos o
cerebros delirantes. Por ejemplo San Juan y su
Apocalipsis. "Johns dreams have exercised a profound effect on the many
millions of perfectly sane and responsible people view the world and to a
varying extent order their lives. His declarations may be thought true, but, in
my sober judgement the image of a baleful Jesus threatening to cleave
dissidents with a first-century sword is so far out of line with the remainder
of the New Testament as to make a simple biological explanation
preferable" (263). Orígenes
del la creencia en la otra vida, en las visiones de los muertos en los sueños,
y aún más en alucinaciones inducidas. ¿A quién se dirige en realidad la obediencia
jurada a las religiones? "Is it to an entity
that may have no meaning within reach of the human mind—or may not even exist?
Yes, perhaps it really is to God. But perhaps it is no more than a tribe united
by a creation myth. If the latter, religious faith is better interpreted as an
unseen trap unavoidable during the biological history of our species. And if
this is correct, surely there exist ways to find spiritual fulfillment without
surrender and enslavement. Humankind deserves better" (267).
26. The Origins of the Creative Arts
Brain is most aroused by patterns having c. 20% redundancy,
common to primitive art and modern design. "A quality of great art is its
ability to guide attention from one of its parts to another in a manner that
pleases, informs and provokes" (271). Universals in taste for landscape:
people "want to be on a height looking down, they prefer open savanna-like
terrain with scattered trees and copses, and they want to be close to a body of
water, such as a river, lake, or ocean" (271-2). Conflicts in human mind
due to 2 types of natural selection: "we can expect a continuing conflict
between components of behavior favored by individual selection and those
favored by group selection. Selection at the individual level tends to create
competitiveness and selfish behavior among group members—in status, mating, and
the securing of resources. In opposition, selection between groups tends to
create selfless behavior, expressed in greater generosity and altruism, which
in turn promote stronger cohesion and strength of the group as a whole. // An
inevitable result of the mutually offsetting forces in multilevel selection is
permanent ambiguity in the individual human mind, leading to countless
scenarios among people in the way they bond, love, affiliate, betray, share,
sacrifice, steal, deceive, redeem, punish, appeal and adjudicate. The struggle
endemic to each person's brain, mirrored in the vast superstructure of cultural
evolution, is the fountainhead of the humanities" (273-74). Scope of the
humanities described as a sum of disciplines and concerns, language,
philosophy, jurisprudence, history, etc.: "Such may be the scope of the
humanities, but it makes no allusion to the understanding of the cognitive
processes that bind them all together, nor their relation to hereditary human
nature, nor their origins in prehistory. Surly we will never see a full
maturing of the humanities until these dimensions are added" (275).
Importance of dreaming and storytelling for innovation: "In the early stages
of creation of both art and science, everything in the mind is a story. There
is an imagined denouement, and perhaps a start, and a selection of bits and
pieces that might fit between" (275). "Science grows in a
manner not well appreciated by nonscientists: it is guided as much by peer
approval as by the truth of its technical claims. Reputation is the silver and
gold of scientific careers" (276). Picasso, "Art is the lie that
helps us to see the truth" (277). Creative explosion in the Paleolithic c.
35,000 years ago in Europe. "From this time on until the Late Paleolithic
period over 20,000 years later, cave art flourished. Thousands of figures,
mostly of large game animals, have been found in more than two hundred caves
distributed throughout southwestern France and northeastern Spain, on both
sides of the Pyrenees" (279) (O sea, en mi vecindario inmediato...). Complexity
of art in primitive cultures. Piraha, no numbers or concept of counting, no
terms for colors, no creation myths, do not draw, yet they have songs.
"Music is closely linked to language in mental development and in some
ways appears to be derived from language" (283).
VI.
Where Are We Going?
27. A New Enlightenment
"Given our miserable lack of self-understanding as a species, the
better goal at this time may be to choose where not to go" (287).
"The more we learn about our physical existence, the more apparent it
becomes that even the most complex forms of human behavior are ultimately
biological." (288). "Yet, by any conceivable standard, humanity is
far and away life's greatest achievement. We are the mind of the biosphere, the
solar system, and—who can say?–perhaps the galaxy. Looking about us, we have
learned to translate into our narrow audivisual systems the sensory modalities
of other organisms. We know much of the physicochemical basis of our own
biology. We will soon create simple organisms in the laboratory. We have
learned the history of the universe and look out almost to its edge"
(288). We are the result of multilevel natural selection, individuals competing
with individuals and collaborating in groups competing with groups: "The
opposition between the two levels of natural selection has resulted in a
chimeric genotype in each person. It renders each of us part saint and part
sinner" (289). Wilson vs. the theory of inclusive fitness and kin
selection, replacing it with "standard models of population genetics
applied to multiple levels of natural selection" (289), a mathematical
critique of inclusive fitness was developed from 2004 to 2010; "group
selection is clearly the process responsible for advanced social behavior"
(289-90). "We understand too well that no one is so wise and great that he
cannot make a catastrophic mistake, or any organization so noble to be free of
corruption. We, all of us, live out our lives in conflict and contention"
(290). "Gossip has always been the favorite occupation, in every society
from hunter-gatherer bands to royal courts. To weigh as accurately as possible
the intentions and trust-worthiness of those who affect our own personal lives
is both very human and highly adaptive. It is also adaptive to judge the impact
of others' behavior on the welfare of the group as a whole. We are geniuses at
reading intentions of others while they too struggle hour by hour with their
own angels and demons" (290-91). Early humans created gods in order to
understand the universe, and as an analogue at a cosmic level of their own
tribal authorities. Religions have been crucial to the identity of groups,
"To question the sacred myths is to question the identity and worth of
those who believe them" (292). "Why, then, is it wise openly to
question the myths and gods of organized religions? Because they are
stultifying and divisive" (...) "Because they encourage ignorance,
distract people from recognizing problems of the real world, and often lead
them in wrong directions into disastrous actions" (292) —they passionately
encourage altruism in the group but often confrontation with other groups.
Belief will be weakened by scientific analysis of its causes. "Another
trend against the misadventure of sectarian devotion is the growth of the
internet and the globalization of institutions and people using it. A recent
analysis has shown that the increasing interconnection of people worldwide
strengthens their cosmopolitan attitude. It does so by weakening the
significance of ethnicity, locality, and nationhood as sources of
identification" (...) Inevitably, it will weaken confidence in creation
myths and sectarian dogmas" (293). Importance of realizing present danger
of exhausting natural resources: "if we save the living world, we will
also automatically save the physical world, because in order to achieve the
first we must also achieve the second" (294). "Another principle that
I believe can be justified by scientific evidence so far is that nobody is
going to emigrate from this planet, not ever" (295) "The same cosmic
myopia exists today a fortiori in dreams of colonizing other star systems. It
is an especially dangerous delusion if we see emigration into space as a
solution to be taken when we have used up this planet" (296). No aliens
visiting us, if exist and have achieved wisdom: "It would be enough to
settle down and explore the limitless possibilities for fulfillment on the home
planet" (297).
—oOo—