The Virtual World We Inhabit:
From Dawkins back to the Future with Hobbes
In Unweaving the Rainbow
(1999, rpt. Penguin, 2016) Richard Dawkins explains why we all move in a
perceptual world which is not "the" world, but a
virtual reality model of the same, a mental model which we take for
the real thing itself.
This may seem far-fetched to
the naive assumptions (and perceptions) of many people, yet it is
self-evident from the moment we realize that although we may partly
share our mental maps and models of the objective world, the section of
the world I perceive and attend to is different from yours, a different
location, a different point of view, etc. etc. Fairly obvious, actually.
Listen to Dawkins:
You and I, we humans, we mammals, we
animals, inhabit a virtual world, constructed from elements that are,
at successively higher levels, useful for representing the real world.
Of course, we feel as if we are firmly placed in the real world—which
is exactly as it should be if our constrained virtual reality software
is any good. It is very good, and the only time we notice it at all is
on the rare occasions when it gets something wrong. When this happens
we experience an illusion or a hallucination, like the hollow mask
illusion we talked about earlier.
The British psychologist
Richard Gregory has paid special attention to visual illusions as a
means of studying how the brain works. In his book Eye and Brain
(fifth edition 1998), he regards seeing as an active process in which
the brain sets up hypotheses about what is going on out there, then
tests those hypotheses about what is going on out there, then tests
those hypotheses against the data coming in from the sense organs. One
of the most familiar of all visual illusions is the Necker cube. This
is a simple line drawing of a hollow cube, like a cube made of steel
rods.
The drawing is a two-dimensional
pattern of ink on paper. Yet a normal human sees it as a cube. The
brain has made a three-dimensional model based upon the two-dimensional
pattern of ink on paper. yet a normal human sees it as a cube. The
brain has made a three-dimensional model based upon the two-dimensional
pattern on the paper. This is, indeed, the kind of thing the brain does
almost every time you look at a picture. The flat pattern of ink on
paper is equally compatible with two alternative three-dimensional
brain models. Stare at the drawing for some seconds and you will see it
flip. The facet that had previously seemed nearest to you will now
appear farthest. Carry on looking, and it will flip back to the
original cube. The brian could have been designed to stick,
arbitrarily, to one of the two cube models, say the first of the two
that it hit upon, even though the other model would have been equally
compatible with the information from the retinas. But in fact the brain
takes the other option of running each model, or hypothesis,
alternately for a few seconds at a time. Hence the apparent cube
alternates, which gives the game away. Our brain constructs a
three-dimensional model. It is virtual reality in the head. (...) The
model in the brain (...) is constructed. But (...) it is, like the
surgeon's computer model of the inside of her patient, not entirely
invented: it is constrained by information fed in from the outside
world. (275-77)
One might compare the brain to a
Popperian scientist, projecting hypotheses onto the world, as a working
model of the same, and correcting those hypotheses only when reality
fails to replicate the experiment. If the perceptual/conceptual model
is thus falsified, a new perceptual pattern or "hypothesis" is
generated to see if it delivers in terms of workable action.
This "top-down" model of
perception corrects the naive "bottom-up" account of the same, which
gives a more passive role to the mind. On this account, the mind would
simply receive the input from the senses, and would construct its
mental model of the world as the result of a one-way process,
world-to-mind. Using the scientific analogy, this would be a Baconian
model of experience: from the collection of data, through induction and
generalization, to the building of laws which account for the world
(the mental models). Our Popperian account of the mind makes for a much
more dynamic role of the mind: it is top-down to a large extent
(although of course it is a dynamic two-way model, both top-down and
bottom-up in a continuous feedback cycle). The mind is not merely
receiving the input of "reality", it is also constructing and projecting
that reality around the mental subject, so that minds are
reality-generation machines, and the more elaborate the mind, the more
mental and more virtual the reality it inhabits. The mind generates its
own space for interaction with the world and with other minds, to the
extent that both physical reality and (especially) social reality are
the result of self-fulfilling expectations.
Expectations that we
call institutions, frames, places
(as socially defined), encounters,
situations, discourses and disciplines.
For another take on
this issue, I refer the reader to these two articles:
- "Goffman: La realidad como
expectativa autocumplida y el teatro de la interioridad" — On the
nature of social reality as a system of self-fulfilling expectations as
theorized by Erving Goffman in his Frame Theory.
- "Constitución
reflexiva de la percepción". By way of Hegel, a reflection on the
construction of visual space as a mental intervention on reality, with
our eyes (in a way) acting as a kind of Super-8 film projectors in a
dark room, a bit like those 17th-c. prints which show Anatomical Men
projecting light beams from their eyes, beams which illuminate the
objects and allow them to be seen. (This is of course an image or
analogy the better to visualize my point).
But it brings me nicely to the my
last observation about our Virtual Reality in the Mind, having to do
with the discovery of this artifact. Of course we would have to go back
through a number of shades of awareness in a number of idealistic
philosophers, from Plato's cavern to Descartes' evil genius.
Nevertheless my example of choice comes from a celebrated materialist,
Thomas Hobbes. We are of course at that point of reasoning about the
world where matter becomes mind becomes matter, and thus Hobbes gives
us (in his account of perception in Leviathan)
a memorable definition of how exactly the world we perceive is a mental
construct—minds being nothing but machines for the construction of such
constructs, including, at a further ratchet of virtuality, their past
and their future states, that is, time itself as a
moving image of reality. (1)
CHAPTER I. OF SENSE
Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first
Singly, and afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another.
Singly, they are every one a Representation or Apparence, of some
quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is commonly
called an Object. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other
parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of
Apparences.
The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there is
no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by
parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived
from that originall.
To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the
business now in hand; and I have els-where written of the same at
large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will
briefly deliver the same in this place.
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth
the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and
Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which
pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes
of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a
resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver
it self: which endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter
without. And this Seeming, or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and
consisteth, as to the Eye, in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare,
in a Sound; To the Nostrill, in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a
Savour; and to the rest of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse,
Softnesse, and such other qualities, as we discern by Feeling. All
which qualities called Sensible, are in the object that causeth them,
but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our
organs diversly. Neither in us that are pressed, are they anything els,
but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But
their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as
pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and
pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or
hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action, For
if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause
them, they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in
Ecchoes by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we
see, is in one place; the apparence, in another. And though at some
certain distance, the reall, and very object seem invested with the
fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing, the image or
fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases, is nothing els but
originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by
the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs
thereunto ordained.
Perhaps augmented reality,
a kind of Google Glass vision, is a better analogue for Hobbes's
account of perception. The mind, subject to perceptual stimuli,
constructs a fanciful or imaginary version of the world, so that the
real and very object seem[s] invested with the fancy it begets in us.
Objects may well be in the world, but objects of perception are
mental constructs: there is no visual appearance of the object without
an eye and a brain, there is no sound whatsoever in a waterfall without
the ear and the brain.
George Berkeley would extract some further consequences of the
empiricist account of perception, and would brazenly define objects and
the world in which they are placed as the products of the mind's
activity, synthesizing the input from the senses and generating
something which is not in the senses, nor in any understandable sense
in a "world without minds".
A world without minds.... Which
is not of course what we usually mean by "the world": it is not the
least of paradoxes that this non-mental "raw" world is only
conceivable, when we come to examine it, as the result of an elaborate
scientific abstraction from the much more intuitive world we inhabit,
the virtual world constructed by our minds and our senses.
__________
(1) For
more on the cognitive construction of time, see my paper on "La
cartografía narrativa en la articulación del mundo humano: El papel de
los esquemas y los textos narrativos."
References
Dawkins, Richard. Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder. Londres: Penguin, 1999. Reimp. Penguin Random House UK, 2016.
García Landa, José Angel. "Constitución reflexiva de la percepción." Vanity Fea 28 julio 2008. (Hegel).
http://garciala.blogia.com/2008/072803-constitucion-reflexiva-de-la-percepcion.php
2008
_____. "Goffman: La realidad como expectativa autocumplida y el teatro de la interioridad." Academia 4 nov. 2013.
http://www.academia.edu/168011/
2013
_____. "'Lo mismo despiertos, que soñando': Hobbes sobre la virtualidad de lo real." Vanity Fea 11 agosto 2015.
http://vanityfea.blogspot.com.es/2015/08/hobbes-sobre-la-virtualidad-de-lo-real.html
2015
_____. "La cartografía narrativa en la articulación del mundo humano: El papel de los esquemas y textos narrativos." ResearchGate 21 oct. 2017.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320551799
2017
_____. "Our Internal Virtual Reality." Vanity Fea 3 nov. 2019.
https://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2019/11/our-internal-virtual-reality.html
2019
_____. "The Virtual World We Inhabit." Vanity Fea 16 nov. 2019. (Preliminary version of the present paper).
https://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2019/11/the-virtual-world-we-inhabit.html
2022
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Online at the Internet Archive.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm
2022
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